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Understanding collective human behavior and dynamics at urban-scale has drawn broad interest
in physics, engineering, and social sciences. Social physics often adopts a statistical perspective and
treats individuals as interactive elementary units, while the economics perspective sees individuals as
strategic decision makers. Here we provide a microscopic mechanism of city-scale dynamics, interpret
the collective outcome in a thermodynamic framework, and verify its various implications empirically.
We capture the decisions of taxi drivers in a game-theoretic model, prove the existence, uniqueness,
and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium. We offer a macroscopic view of this equilibrium
with laws of thermodynamics. With 870 million trips of over 50k drivers in New York City, we verify
this equilibrium in space and time, estimate an empirical constitutive relation, and examine the
learning process at individual and collective levels. Connecting two perspectives, our work shows a
promising approach to understand collective behavior of subpopulations.
Keywords: urban-scale dynamics, collective behavior of individuals, human behavior change, social physics
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantitative understanding of collective human behav-
ior and its dynamics has been the focus of a long-standing,
interdisciplinary collection of research. Such efforts span
across physics [1–15], engineering [16–20], economics [21–
27], and planning [28–30]. Cities, as agglomerations of
human beings, are the natural setting for such studies.
Thanks to ubiquitous data sensing techniques, a host of
urban phenomena, ranging from traffic [5] to building
energy use [30] and transaction patterns [31], can now be
analyzed quantitatively. Research in the physical sciences
often value simplistic models that fit data well. Social sci-
ences, on the other hand, emphasize individual incentive
and realistic theory. Models that connect these perspec-
tives and are backed by empirical data would therefore
be a valuable contribution to this literature.
Social physics [1] or social dynamics [7, 9, 10] are ap-
proaches that use physical models to describe collective
human behavior. A useful framework for this is statistical
physics, where individuals are seen as elementary units
and collective phenomena emerge from their interactions
[10]. Random walk models are used to study human mobil-
ity at individual level [4]. Non-equilibrium phase transition
is observed in the transition of urban traffic from free flow
to congestion [6]. Scaling laws of socioeconomic and infras-
tructure indicators on population have been discovered
and generative mechanisms proposed [2, 11]. Based on
non-equilibrium statistical physics, sociodynamics models
the evolution of city configuration with a master equation
[7], and finds application in studying the impact of trans-
portation system on regional development [8]. Entropy
models have been used to study spatial structure and
interaction [29]. Other tools in statistical physics such
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as spin-like models also find use in the science of cities
[14]. Other theories in physics have been adopted as well.
Social force and social field models quantify the most prob-
able behavioural change of individuals [9]. Force fields
resulting from infrastructure and socioeconomic layouts
affect urban morphology [12]. Gravity and radiation have
inspired models for human mobility at population level
[13]. In particular, a potential field can be well-defined
from commute flows in a city [15].
Game theory and economics, on the other hand, con-
sider collective phenomena as results of strategic decision
making of individuals, and it is therefore crucial to cap-
ture individual incentives realistically. Discussion on traf-
fic equilibrium predates modern game theory [21, 22], and
has been formalized since [16, 23, 24]. Spatial equilibrium
generalizes this idea to explain many problems in urban
economics [25]. Game theory has also been used to study
social network formation [3]. Equilibrium outcomes are
often different from social optimal, and there are many
efforts to quantify such inefficiency [18, 19] and find ways
to minimize it [5].
These perspectives from physical and social sciences
rarely come together, partly because it is difficult to ac-
count for the different incentive structures within a popu-
lation and provide a simplistic, universal understanding.
Consider urban transportation. People move for various
reasons and often do not minimize their travel time as
assumed in traffic equilibrium. But a model that accounts
for heterogeneous incentives often evades an equilibrium
solution. Here we bridge the two perspectives by study-
ing the behavior and dynamics of a subpopulation—taxi
drivers. As ride service providers and independent con-
tractors, these drivers move around a city to maximize
income. Using GPS data, recent work has shown that their
revenue are affected by their strategies in search, delivery,
and service-region preference [20]. Gender earnings gap
among drivers of a ride-hailing company is explained by
their driving speed, experience, and service location and
time [26]. Moreover, drivers with higher incomes benefit
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2significantly from their ability to learn from local and
global demand information [27].
In this paper, we regard the regularity in urban trans-
portation as the equilibrium outcome of individual deci-
sion making in response to transportation demand and ser-
vices [32]. In particular, we provide a microscopic, game-
theoretic model for taxi transportation and interpret its
equilibrium in a macroscopic framework of thermodynam-
ics. Given exogenous traffic speeds and passenger demand,
the income maximization of drivers leads to an economic
equilibrium. We formalize drivers’ decision making as a
non-cooperative game, prove the existence and unique-
ness of its Nash equilibrium, and show its stability under
simple learning dynamics such as adaptive learning and
social learning. We also provide an interpretation of this
equilibrium as a thermodynamic equilibrium, and describe
the laws of thermodynamics, constitutive relation, and
fundamental thermodynamic relation. With five years
of New York City (NYC) taxi trip records, we validate
the equilibrium in space and over time, and estimate
an empirical constitutive relation. We also examine the
learning process of individual drivers, as well as their
adjustment as a group to a new system. We discuss the
economic efficiency of taxi transportation, as well as an
alternative formulation of strategy. This paper therefore
offers a microscopic mechanism of city-scale dynamics,
and empirically verify its various implications. Connecting
social and physical science perspectives, our work shows
a promising approach to understand collective human
behavior and dynamics.
II. RESULTS
A. Game model
We assume that each driver chooses their driving strat-
egy to maximize income, which we show to be strategically
equivalent to revenue maximization. Taxi activity varies
in space (see fig. 1a-b), and we define the strategy of a
driver in service to be how they allocate their service time
across the city. Let six be the proportion of service time
driver i allocates on street segment x and E be the set
of street segments in the road network, then the driver’s
strategy is si = (six)x∈E , whose components sum to 1.
Figure 1c illustrates driver strategy. We can formalize a
driver’s decision as an optimization problem:
maximize pii(si; s−i, E)
subject to si ≥ 0
si · 1 = 1
(1)
Here, with hour as the unit of time, pii is the expected
hourly revenue of the driver, s−i =
∑
j 6=i sj is the aggre-
gate strategy of other drivers, and E is environment con-
dition which includes traffic speed and passenger demand.
For details of driver decision making, see Supplementary
Note A 1.
Competition among drivers could lead to specific
choices of strategies, called equilibrium. If we see every
street segment as a distinct market and every driver in
service as a multi-market firm, we can abstract eq. (1) as
a game of multi-market competition among firms of equal
capacity. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium (NE),
where all drivers use the same strategy and marginal
driver revenue are uniform across all searched segments.
Moreover, the equilibrium is globally asymptotically sta-
ble under adaptive learning [33] and/or imitative learning
[1, 34, 35]. Denote this equilibrium as S∗ = (s∗i )i∈N , where
N is the set of drivers in service. Because all drivers
use the same strategy, let s =
∑
i∈N si, we can write
S∗ = n−1s∗1Tn , where n = |N | is the number of drivers in
service. The equilibrium can be determined such that s∗
is the unique point that maximizes a potential function:
Φ(s) =
∑
x∈E
∫ sx
0
φx(t) dt (2)
where φx(s
∗
x) = (∂pii/∂six)(S
∗) is marginal driver revenue
on a segment at equilibrium, see fig. 1d. For details of the
game model, see Supplementary Note A 2.
B. Thermodynamic interpretation
We can interpret the Nash equilibrium of drivers as
a thermodynamic equilibrium. This establishes a macro-
scopic equilibrium where aggregate behavior is perceived
as a transport phenomenon built up from individual
choices. This macroscopic view ignores the decision mak-
ing and competition of drivers, but helps understand the
outcome of a social system from the perspective of a
physical system.
We regard drivers as interchangeable particles with
identical behavior at equilibrium. Regard total service
time s, which equals the number of drivers in service, as
total energy of the taxi transportation system. Regard
potential function Φ of the game as entropy of the system.
And regard the reciprocal of equilibrium marginal driver
revenue, ψ = 1/φ, as temperature. Then s, ψ, and Φ
are all state variables of the system at equilibrium given
environment condition E .
Being a state variable and intensive property, temper-
ature ψ is the driving force of the transport of service
time s over the street segments. As we mentioned ear-
lier, the learning process of the game always increases
the potential function Φ(s), which is maximized at equi-
librium. When two systems at equilibrium are put into
contact with an interface permeable to the transfer of
service time, s will flow from the system with higher ψ
to the one with lower ψ. At equilibrium, ψ is uniform
across all searched segments. In summary, we can make
the following statements of thermodynamics. Zeroth law:
two taxi systems in contact have the same equilibrium
marginal driver revenue.
ψ1 = ψ2 (3)
3FIG. 1. Driver strategy. a-b, Manhattan street network used in this paper, showing characteristics of taxi activity: a, quantile
of drop-off per segment length; b, log2 pickup-dropoff ratio. Black bold line marks the north border of core Manhattan. c,
drivers allocate their service time across the segments, which can differ. d, model of equilibrium. With s drivers, marginal driver
revenue ν on a segment at equilibrium is determined by
∑
x∈E sx(ν) = s. Equilibrium allocation on each segment can then be
determined by s∗x = sx(ν).
First law: taxi transportation is the transfer process of
total service time s, which is a conserved quantity.
ds =
∑
x∈E
dsx (4)
Second law: under fixed demand and traffic state, a closed
taxi system maximizes its potential function.
dΦ ≥ δs
ψ
(5)
Zeroth law defines equivalent classes of equilibrium,
which are strictly totally ordered by state variable ψ. The
manifold of equilibrium is thus one-dimensional, parame-
terized by ψ, and any other state variable must depend
on it. This means that state space (Φ, s, ψ) | E has only
one degree of freedom, and this dependency is the consti-
tutive relation of the system given environment condition
E , which can be written explicitly as
(Φ, ψ)(s) | E (6)
Rearranging the exact differential of s(Φ) | E gives the
fundamental thermodynamic relation of the equilibrium:
ds = ψdΦ (7)
We test various implications of this theory of thermo-
dynamics in our empirical results.
C. Verification of spatial equilibrium
To verify that drivers actually follow the theoretical
equilibrium, we proceed in two parts. First, all drivers
use the same strategy. Second, given that drivers use the
same strategy, marginal driver revenue is uniform across
all searched segments.
Although driver strategy—the spatial distribution of
service time—is not directly observed, it is proportional
to driver pickup probability on each segment. If all drivers
use the same strategy, each driver’s pickup probability
distribution across segments shall be the same as that of
the overall distribution. Then each driver’s actual pickups
shall be a sample of the corresponding categorical random
variable. Since there are 6,001 street segments, pickup
records of each driver is not enough to test the probability
model. We partition the segments into 10 equi-probable
groups, so pickup counts in these groups shall be a multi-
nomial random variable with the same probability for
each group. Drivers’ pickup counts in these groups can be
tested by a corrected log likelihood ratio of multinomial
distributions [36]. For each driver, the pickup counts are
normalized into a probability vector x = (x1, . . . , x10),
which is then summarized by the 1-norm ‖x′‖1, where
x′ = x − 1/10. We consider a strategy to be a large
deviation if ‖x′‖1 exceeds 0.3. Note that ‖x′‖1 = 0.2 if
the pickups in any one group is arbitrarily allocated to
the other groups. Fig. 2a shows the distribution of ‖x′‖1.
Only 3.66% of drivers have statistically significant large
deviations. Although the threshold for large deviation is
arbitrary, the result shows that most drivers use similar
strategies. Therefore we can regard drivers to be particles
with identical behavior.
Now we verify that all segments have the same marginal
driver revenue, or equivalently, the same temperature. We
4FIG. 2. Verification of dynamic equilibrium. Using trip records in Spring 2011 and Spring 2012. a, probability distribution of
1-norm of driver deviation from average strategy, in Tue-Thu PM peaks, 6pm–10pm, grouped by p-values. 3.66% of drivers have
statistically significant (p > 0.05) large deviations (‖x′‖1 > 0.3). b, log of search time–revenue ratio on street segments, Mon-Fri
6pm–7pm, shifted to a reference value. Local regression (red) and prediction intervals (shade). Distribution of log revenue on
segments (margin). c-d, average number of drivers and driver revenue, Wed 5am–Thu 5am: c, time series, rectangles mark AM
shift (8:30am–4pm) and PM shift (6pm–4am); d, trajectory, colored by the hour, red line shows a linear regression for 5pm.
note that when n 1, φx ≈ pix/sx, where pix is the rev-
enue originated on a segment and sx is the total service
time attributable to the segment. Because at any moment
the number of drivers in service in Manhattan is in the
thousands, this approximation is suitable. So it suffices
to show that pix is proportional to sx, which is the sum of
search time tsx and trip time tpx per unit time. Because
the majority of trips are metered, which is calculated from
trip distance and time in slow traffic, driver revenue from
each trip is highly correlated to trip duration regardless
of driver strategy, especially when traffic speed is hold
stationary. To avoid the influence of this fact, consider
trip time as a linear function of trip revenue, then pix ∝ sx
is equivalent to pix ∝ tsx, and we try to show the latter.
Because search routes are not recorded in the trip records,
we take trip records between 6pm and 7pm on weekdays in
spring, and estimate search routes between trips by short-
est distance routing. We consider this approach acceptable
because during the selected hours, traffic is roughly at
a uniform congested speed while average search time is
the shortest, so route deviation from the shortest path
is unlikely. Figure 2b shows log(t˜sx/pix) versus log(pix),
where t˜sx is the estimated search time. The majority of
street segments have similar search-revenue ratios, while
segments with low revenue appear to be over-supplied
and those with very high revenue under-supplied. For seg-
ments with low revenue, marginal driver revenue might
not be equilibrated since they contribute little to driver
revenue. Our estimation assigns search time equally to
each segment on route, which may underestimate the
actual search time near the pickup location, and there-
fore underestimate search time on high revenue segments.
Moreover, shortest path routing provides a single route
for trips with the same origin and destination, so the esti-
mated search time may be concentrated on a few street
segments, which contributes to estimation error.
D. Dynamic equilibrium
As environment condition E varies over times of a
day, the equilibrium will also vary. If drivers are free
to choose when to work and are indifferent about working
at different times of a day, by zeroth law eq. (3), driver
supply s will adjust so that temperature ψ is station-
ary throughout a day. Equivalently, φ stays the same
throughout a day. Note that marginal driver revenue on
a segment and average driver revenue are approximately
5FIG. 3. Learning and adjustment of equilibrium. a-c, percentile of strategy deviation of new drivers joined in a 2012, b 2011,
and c 2010, grouped by years of consecutive driving up to 2013, size of each group shown in parentheses. Using trip records in
springs, Tue-Thu PM peaks, 6pm–10pm. d, pickup probability in the region bordering core Manhattan, in the second halves of
2012 (black) and 2013 (red), 7-day rolling value with 90% bootstrap confidence band. Significant events and period marked by
dashes and shade.
the same at equilibrium: because φx ≈ pix/sx, therefore
φ ≈ ∑x pix/∑x sx = pi/s. This means that, given the
assumptions, average driver revenue is the same through-
out a day. To verify this, we examine the trajectory of
average driver revenue and number of drivers throughout
a typical weekday, shown in Fig. 2c. Average driver rev-
enues during 8:30am–4pm and 6pm–4am center around
$29/hour and $33.5/hour respectively, and are constant
in the sense that its overall variation is about the same as
its short-term variation. The difference between average
driver revenue for these two periods can be explained by
two factors. First, the total number of taxis is limited and
not all is available for the night shift, so not all drivers
who would like to work at night can get a taxi. Second,
the lease rate for day shifts is less than those of night
shifts, so the difference in average driver income between
the two periods is less than that of average driver rev-
enue. During 4pm–6pm most double-shifted taxis change
drivers, which means supply decisions during this period
is not up to the drivers, so the average driver revenue is
not constant. During 3am–6am very few drivers are at
work, and the high average driver revenue justifies the
cost of working when most people prefer to be sleeping.
During 6am–8:30am most day shift drivers start working,
and although the average driver revenue is not constant,
it stabilizes as more drivers become active.
In contrast to the equilibration of average driver rev-
enue over time, by constitutive relation eq. (6), marginal
driver revenue on a segment at equilibrium is a decreas-
ing function of the number of drivers given environment
condition: φ(s) | E . This constitutive relation is hard to
measure without controlled experiment, but can be mea-
sured from observational data if the number of drivers is
forced to change much faster than the environment does,
such as during shift transition. In fig. 2d, the downward
trend in 5pm–6pm reflects φ(s) for that time of day, when
people leave work and taxis return for the night shift.
E. Individual learning
It is natural to ask if drivers learn to use the same
strategy that results in a spatially uniform marginal rev-
enue. We use drivers’ first appearance in trip records to
infer if they are new or experience drivers. The rate of
new drivers stabilizes around September 2009, with about
10.23 new drivers each day since. For new drivers joined
each spring from 2010 to 2012, we compute the 1-norm of
their strategy deviation, ‖x′‖1, and compare it with the
group of experienced driver who worked through 2010-
2013. In particular, we group each year’s new drivers by
their eventual consecutive years of driving up to 2013,
and track their percentile of ‖x′‖1 against the experienced
drivers. Figure 3a-c provide box plots for the groups. Note
6that the experienced drivers, if plotted, would always have
the median and the first and third quartiles at 50, 25,
and 75, respectively. For all groups of new drivers who
stayed for at least a year, their strategy deviation decrease
significantly in the second year, with the median reducing
between 10 to 20 percentile. For new drivers who stayed
through 2013 and for at least two years, their strategy
deviation stabilize in the later years and are smaller or the
same as the experienced drivers. Moreover, new drivers
who stay longer always have smaller strategy deviation
than their cohorts. We see that new drivers learn the
equilibrium strategy within one year of driving.
F. Group adjustment
Changes in taxi regulation affect the equilibrium, which
provide unique opportunities to test the implications of
the theory. On 2013-08-08, NYC TLC launched Street
Hail Livery, also known as green cabs. The new system
is allowed to pick up street-hail passengers outside core
Manhattan, defined as south of West 110th Street and
East 96th Street, see fig. 1a-b. This change gradually
increased the supply of street-hail service outside core
Manhattan, and by constitutive relation eq. (6) this should
decrease the marginal driver revenue on segments therein.
By zeroth law eq. (3), segments within core Manhattan
should also have marginal driver revenue decreased to
the same level, which implies more supply of yellow cabs
in core Manhattan where they have exclusive rights to
service. By first law eq. (4), the proportion of service time
yellow cab drivers spent outside core Manhattan should
decrease. Figure 3d compares the time-series of percentage
of pickups in the region bordering core Manhattan in 2012
and 2013. This percentage slightly reduced after the 2012
fare raise, greatly increased during Hurricane Sandy, and
moderately increased during Thanksgiving and Christmas.
Excluding irregularities due to Hurricane Sandy and the
holidays, the percentage is stable in the last two months
of both years, with a robust decline in 2013.
III. DISCUSSION
The equilibrium is not socially optimal in general. A
socially optimal outcome would maximize total revenue,
whereas the equilibrium maximizes the potential function.
In fact, if total revenue is maximized, marginal segment
revenue ∂pix/∂sx should be the same for all searched
segments. At Nash equilibrium, a weighted average of
marginal and average segment revenue is made uniform
instead, with more weight on the latter as the number
of drivers in service increases. This difference implies an
inefficiency of the equilibrium, except for special choices of
pix(sx). For details of the inefficiency, see Supplementary
Note A 3. This phenomenon of difference between coopera-
tive and competitive decisions has been studied for a long
time under different names. Economic inefficiency [37, 38]
refers to a situation where total income, or social wealth,
is not maximized. The problem of social cost [21, 22] is
the divergence between private and social costs or value.
Later developments include external effect [39], rent dissi-
pation [40], market failure [41], and transaction cost [42].
Algorithmic game theory uses price of anarchy [18, 19] and
price of stability for this inefficiency of equilibria. Despite
the various terminology, the essence of the problem is the
same: when individuals do not have incentive to maximize
the total revenue, equilibrium naturally will differ from
the optimum set, which by definition results in less total
revenue. If people put a moderate weight towards the
total outcome, much of the inefficiency can be avoided
[5]. Here we propose the main takeaway for the case of
multi-market oligopoly: if a property is heterogeneous in
productivity, the owner cannot obtain the optimal rent by
leasing to multiple tenants without contracting on their
allocation of effort.
Now we point out how a driver would implement a
search strategy. Picture a driver i who is familiar with
city traffic and hailer and driver distributions throughout
a day. To earn more money, the driver has a plan on
how much time to spend searching different places for
hailers; the plan may vary for different time of day. At the
beginning of i’s shift, the driver heads to the region where
the plan allocates the most search time. After delivering
the first pickup, the driver is likely to be in a region
with less planned search time. To avoid over-searching the
current region, i drives back to the preferred region. If i
goes through the preferred region without a pickup, the
driver would circle around and continue the search, as long
as the total search time within the region is not too long
compared with the plan. The driver does not always search
or immediately go back to the region with the highest
planned search time, but would balance the allocation of
realized search time to approximate the plan. But when i
drops off at a location with very little planned search time,
the driver would directly head to a place nearby where
the plan gives more search time, since a single pass would
typically suffice for the drop-off location. Because the
total search time is limited for any given shift, the driver
would not be able to perfectly implement the strategy
in one shift. But aggregated over time, the distribution
of realized search time could reasonably approximate an
intended strategy.
Driver’s search strategy can be alternatively formalized
as a Markov chain. That is, depending on the current
location, the driver chooses probabilistically a neighboring
location to search. If drivers are non-strategic, a null
hypothesis for the Markov strategy would be random walk.
However, fig. 1b suggests that drivers tend to move back
to the area with more pickups. We test out this hypothesis
in fig. 4. We see that, regardless of trip origin, locations
with more pickups tend to be popular destinations as well.
Overall the drop-off distribution is more spread out than
the pickup distribution. On the other hand, the search
matrix is diagonal dominated and skews towards more
popular locations. In particular, group 1 accounts for 42%
7FIG. 4. Markov strategy. Using trip records in Spring 2011 and Spring 2012, Mon-Fri 6pm–7pm. a, trip origin–destination
matrix among 10 equal-sized groups of street segments in decreasing order of pickups. Rows normalized by 1-norm to show
transition probability. Margins show pickup and drop-off counts in each group. b, search start–end matrix among the groups.
Rows normalized by max-norm.
of pickups and 32% of drop-offs, and comparatively very
few drivers find their next pickup in other groups. As the
drop-off location gets less popular, the skew away from less
popular groups and towards more popular ones become
more prominent. Because search time is typically short
in the PM peak, most drivers do not need to drive far to
find passengers. Although a Markovian search strategy
may be simple to describe and implement, it is difficult
to estimate and does not allow a simple thermodynamic
interpretation. Moreover, it is equivalent to our definition
of search strategy. For details of the Markov strategy, see
Supplementary Note A 4.
IV. METHODS
A. Taxi trip records
The New York City (NYC) Taxi and Limousine Com-
mission (TLC) started its Taxicab Passenger Enhance-
ment Program (TPEP) in late 2008, which collects elec-
tronic trip record of its Medallion taxis (aka yellow cabs).
TLC releases TPEP records to the public per the Freedom
of Information Law of New York State. We have gathered
the records from 2009 to 2013, the first five calendar years
since TPEP devices were installed in all 13,237 Medallion
taxis. The data set contains over 870 million trips and
50,297 frequent drivers. Each trip record contains medal-
lion ID (for vehicles), hack license (for drivers), latitude,
longitude and time stamp of pickup and drop-off, trip
distance, fare amounts, and other attributes. We use the
ID fields to link a taxi between consecutive trips, and
derive new attributes for use in our study. The original
and processed data are available for reuse at [43].
B. Road network and map matching
We use OpenStreetMap (OSM) data for the public
non-freeway vehicular road network in NYC. Specifically,
we include OSM ways whose highway tag take one of
the following values: trunk, primary, secondary, tertiary,
unclassified, residential. To make the road network strongly
connected, we removed tunnels, bridges, and link roads.
The filtered OSM map has 8,928 locations and 11,458
edges. We use Open Source Routing Machine (OSRM)
to create a compressed graph of 6,001 edges. We exploit
another module in OSRM to match GPS locations to
the nearest segment, where longitudes and latitudes are
transformed in Mercator projection for isotropic local
scales of distance. The modified code is available at https:
//github.com/rudazhan/osrm-backend.
Appendix A: Supplementary notes
1. Taxi driver decision making
The transportation decision of a taxi driver can be
simply expressed as: taxi drivers maximize their income
by choosing their driving strategy. We ignore the exit
decision of taxi drivers, and assume that individuals who
drive a taxi can earn at least as much income as their
cost, i.e. their alternative income. When this condition
does not hold, rational individuals would not be driving
a taxi. We show in the following that driver’s objective
function is strategically equivalent to trip revenue, and
formalize driver’s decision as an optimization problem.
Income structure of a taxi driver differs by the property
rights of the taxi in use. Owner-drivers are Medallion
owners who also drive their taxis, so they have no lease
to pay. Drivers of driver-owned vehicle (DOV) lease
8a Medallion from fleets, agents, or Medallion owners,
and either own or finance the purchase of the vehicle,
at different lease costs. Other drivers lease both the
Medallion and the vehicle. In any kind of such leases,
the driver pays a fixed amount of money either per shift
which lasts 12 hours, or per week in longer-term leases.
(See TLC Rules §58-21: Leasing a Taxicab or Medallion.)
The lease may optionally include gasoline surcharge,
also a fixed amount, since 2012-09-30. (See TLC lease
cap rules change. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/
downloads/pdf/archived_public_notices/lease_
cap_rules_passed.pdf) Taxi lease type can be inferred
from driver names on the taxi’s rate card: if a taxi has
named drivers, its owner typically uses long-term lease; if
it has unspecified driver, its owner typically uses shift
lease. Table I shows the number of NYC taxis in 2005 by
their manager and driver types, derived from [44].
TABLE I. NYC taxis by manager-driver type, 2005
Owner-driver Named driver Unspecified
Owner 3730 1210 -
Fleet - 1481 635
Agent - 1435 4305
Taxi drivers also pay for fuel usage, which depends on
vehicle model, vehicle speed and acceleration, air tem-
perature, and air conditioning. As of vehicle model, after
the 2008-05-02 TLC auction, 275 of the 13237 Medal-
lions are restricted to alternative fuel vehicles, but many
unrestricted Medallion owners voluntarily converted to
clean-fuel vehicles (see Table II, data from TLC 2008-
2013 Annual Reports http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/
html/archive/annual.shtml). For gasoline/hybrid light
passenger vehicles operating at urban traffic speed (16-
40 km/h, or 10-25 mph), fuel consumption per hour is
almost constant, see [45]. This means that fuel cost per
service time can be seen as a constant for each taxicab
regardless of speed — we do not consider taxis parked by
the curb with engine off actively in service. Even without
this observation, fuel cost per service time would still be
approximately constant for a driver in one shift, as long as
the driver has consistent driving speeds and acceleration
patterns.
TABLE II. NYC taxis by vehicle fuel type
End of year Gasoline Hybrid-electric Diesel CNG*
2007 12422 728 0 -
2008 11394 1843 0 -
2009 10177 3043 17 -
2010 9029 4185 19 4
2011 7540 5681 14 2
2012 6455 6769 10 3
2013 5320 7905 9 3
*CNG: compressed natural gas
A taxi driver earns the remaining fare and tips after
paying for lease, fuel, or both. Formally, the hourly income
ui of driver i derives from hourly trip revenue pii, minus
hourly fuel cost fi, minus amortized hourly lease payment
ri:
ui = pii − fi − ri (A1)
The amortized hourly lease payment by the driver is
ri = Ri/Ti, where Ti denotes driver total service time
during the lease term, and Ri denotes lease payment, i.e.
rent of the Medallion taxicab. Depending on the lease,
fi or ri may be zero. Since fi and ri are constant for
driver i in any given shift, they do not affect the driver’s
driving strategy. Thus, driver’s objective is strategically
equivalent to trip revenue pii. We note that although
vehicle maintenance is another cost to drivers who own
the vehicle, it is not relevant to the driver strategy of our
interest.
To define taxi drivers’ driving strategy, we first analyze
taxi transportation. Taxis in service are either vacant
or occupied: when vacant, drivers search the streets for
hailers; when occupied, drivers take the passengers to their
destination. Taxi drivers can freely choose how they spend
their search time over the street network. Once they find
hailers, drivers will stop searching and pick them up. (In
real life, not all taxi drivers pick up every hailer they meet.
They may discriminate hailers based on the destination,
race, or other factors, due to profitability, security, or end-
of-shift concerns. See NYC 311 records for complaints
about taxis service denial.) Taxi fare rate is set by the
city government, which may be metered or has a flat rate,
depending on the destination. Under flat rate, drivers are
best off taking the fastest path. Metered rates charge by
distance or duration, based on a speed threshold, which
are typically set such that drivers have no incentive to
drive slow. Although drivers do have an incentive to take
routes longer than the fastest path, passengers typically
are motivated to supervise trip duration. In case of driver
fraud, detouring is not a common strategy [46]. Thus,
we assume that taxi driver’s delivery strategy is to take
passengers to their destination via the fastest path, so trip
duration between two specific locations only depend on
traffic speed. We can see that the only strategic element
for taxi drivers is how they allocate their search time.
Now we formalize drivers’ driving strategy. Let N be
the set of taxi drivers currently in service. Let G = (V,E)
be the road network within the urban area being studied,
where V is the set of intersections and dead ends, and E
is the set of street segments. Street segment x ∈ E has
length lx, with traffic speed vx and taxi search speed v˜x.
Define demand rate µdxy as the frequency of hailers start
hailing on segment x who are going to segment y; such
a group of hailers have impatience µtxy = 1/ETxy, the
reciprocal of hailer mean patience. Within a short time
interval, environment condition E = (v,µd,µt) can be
considered as constant, where v is the vector of traffic
speeds, and µd and µt are matrices of hailer demand
and impatience. Strategy for driver i can be defined as
the spatial distribution of supply rates µsi, where µsix =
(µsi)x is the frequency at which driver i enters segment
9x as a vacant taxi. Equivalently, driver strategy can be
defined as the distribution of driver’s search time per unit
time:
tsix
t
=
lx
v˜x
µsix (A2)
This shows that on each segment, driver search time is
linearly related to driver supply rate. Define pickup rate
µpixy as the frequency at which driver i picks up passen-
gers on x going to y. These attributes naturally aggregates
on each segment: µpx =
∑
i
∑
y µpixy, µsx =
∑
i µsix,
µdx =
∑
y µdxy, and µtx = 1/ETx. Pickup rate can thus
be expressed as a function of supply rate, demand rate
and hailer impatience: µpx(µsx, µdx, µtx). [32] proposed a
class of pickup models and proved that the pickup rate
functions are increasing, strictly concave, and arbitrarily
differentiable, with respect to supply rate; for three rep-
resentative models, analytical forms of the pickup rate
functions are also provided.
We now relate driver strategy with driver revenue. Let
Πxy be the revenue of a single trip from x to y, which only
depends on traffic speeds v. We can write hourly revenue
originated on x as pix =
∑
y Πxyµpxy and average revenue
of a trip originated on x as Πx = pix/µpx. Assume patience
and destination are approximately uncorrelated for hailers
with the same origin, which means ∀x, y ∈ E,µtx ≈ µtxy.
Then hailers on the same segment have an equal chance
of being picked up regardless of their destination:
∀x ∈ E,µpxy ∝ µdxy,∀y ∈ E
Thus, the average revenue for a trip originated on x only
depends on traffic speeds and demand rates: Πx(v,µdx) =∑
y Πxyµdxy/µdx. Since drivers are assumed not to dis-
criminate hailers:
∀i ∈ N, ∀x ∈ E,µpixy ∝ µpxy,∀y ∈ E
Driver revenue originated on a segment
piix =
∑
y Πxyµpixy can thus be written as
piix =
∑
y Πxyµpxyµpix/µpx = Πxµpix. Since each
pass of a vacant taxi has an equal chance of picking up a
hailer regardless of the driver:
∀x ∈ E,µpix ∝ µsix,∀i ∈ N
We have piix = Πxµpix = Πxµpxµsix/µsx. Driver hourly
trip revenue can thus be expressed with explicit function
dependency as:
pii =
∑
x∈E
piix =
∑
x∈E
Πx(v,µdx)µpx(µsx, µdx, µtx)
µsix
µsx
(A3)
A more analytically convenient definition of driver
strategy is driver’s allocation of service time. Service
time tix = tsix + tpix is the total time driver i spends
searching and delivering trips originated on x during
a period of time t. The rationale of using service time
distribution as driver strategy instead of supply rate or
search time is that: service time is a conserved quan-
tity and identical for all drivers; meanwhile, service time
is monotonic in supply rate and preserves properties
of the pickup rate function. Let txy be the trip dura-
tion from x to y, which only depends on traffic speeds
v. The average duration of a trip originated on x is
tx(v,µdx) =
∑
y txyµdxy/µdx =
∑
y txyµpxy/µpx, with
reasoning similar to average trip revenue Πx. The propor-
tion of time driver i spends delivering trips originated on
x is thus tpix/t =
∑
y txyµpixy =
∑
y txyµpxyµpix/µpx =
txµpix = txµpxµsix/µsx, with reasoning similar to piix.
Together with Equation A2, the proportion of service
time driver i allocates on x can thus be written as:
six =
tsix + tpix
t
=
(
lx
v˜x
+ tx
µpx
µsx
)
µsix (A4)
This shows that on each segment, driver service time is
also linearly related to driver supply rate: ∀x ∈ E, six ∝
µsix,∀i ∈ N . From Equation A4, service time on a seg-
ment sx = µsxlx/v˜x + µpxtx. With pickup rate function
µpx(µsx, µdx, µtx) and constant environment condition
E , pickup rate is implicitly a function of service time:
µpx(sx, E). Each taxi driver must allocate all the service
time among the street segments:
∑
x tix = t, or equiva-
lently
∑
x six = 1. The driving strategy of taxi driver i is
thus si ∈ Si, where the strategy space Si = ∆|E|−1, a sim-
plex of dimension one less than the number of segments.
Now we can formally write the optimization problem of a
taxi driver:
maximize
∑
x∈E
Πx(v,µdx)µpx(sx, E)six
sx
subject to si ≥ 0
si · 1 = 1
(A5)
Now we prove that pickup rate µpx(sx, E) is also increas-
ing, strictly concave, and arbitrarily differentiable with
respect to sx. With constant environment condition E ,
the implicit function can be abstracted to z = ax + by,
where z = sx, x = µsx, y = µpx, a = lx/v˜x, and b = tx;
y(x) is increasing, strictly concave, and arbitrarily differ-
entiable, while a, b > 0 are constants. Our proposition is
thus equivalent to: y(z) is also increasing, strictly concave,
and arbitrarily differentiable. Differentiability is simply
preserved by the linear relation. Since z(x) = ax+ by(x)
is increasing, its inverse x(z) is thus also increasing; by
composition, y(z) = y(x(z)) is also increasing. By im-
plicit differentiation, dy/dz = y′(x)/(a + by′(x)), and
thus d2y/dz2 = ay′′(x)/(a+by′(x))3. Since y′(x) > 0 and
y′′(x) < 0, y′′(z) < 0, which means y(z) is also strictly
concave.
2. Multi-market oligopoly
In this section we formalize the game of multi-market
competition among firms of equal capacity, and prove that
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the game has Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric
and essentially unique in that marginal player payoffs are
uniform across all invested markets.
We use subscript x to denote a market, or product; sub-
script i for a firm, or player; subscript −i for opponents of
firm i. Boldface denotes a vector; single subscript indicates
summation. Conditions in parentheses are optional.
Game setup of multi-market oligopoly. For firms i ∈ N ,
|N | = n, each distributing a unit of resources over markets
x ∈ E, |E| = m:
1. Total payoff in a market ux(sx), sx ≥ 0, ux(0) = 0,
is (increasing) non-decreasing, differentiable, and
(strictly) concave;
2. Payoff per investment in a market px(sx) = ux/sx,
sx > 0, is (decreasing) non-increasing; not necessar-
ily convex;
3. Player payoff in a market uix(six; s−ix) = px(sx)six,
six ∈ [0, 1], s−ix =
∑
j 6=i sjx ∈ [0, n− 1];
4. Player payoff ui(si; s−i) =
∑
x uix(six; s−ix), si ∈
Si = ∆
m−1, s−i =
∑
j 6=i sj ∈ S−i = (n − 1)∆m−1;
Here ∆m−1 = {v ∈ Rm | v ≥ 0,v · 1 = 1} is the
(m− 1)-dimensional simplex.
5. Marginal player payoff in a market at equilib-
rium φx(sx) = px(sx) + p
′
x(sx)sx/n, or equivalently
φx(sx) = u
′
x(sx)/n + (1 − 1/n)ux(sx)/sx, is (posi-
tive) non-negative, (decreasing) non-increasing;
6. Potential function Φ(s) =
∑
x
∫ sx
0
φx(t) dt,
s ∈ n∆m−1, thus Φ(s) =∑
x
[
ux(sx)/n+ (1− 1/n)
∫ sx
0
ux(t)/t dt
]
;
Multi-market oligopoly is similar to Cournot oligopoly
[47], but differs in significant ways. In Cournot oligopoly,
each player chooses a production level of the same prod-
uct, whose marginal return decreases with total pro-
duction; while the multi-market oligopoly can be seen
as a multi-product Cournot game, where all players
have the same total productivity. Formally, Cournot
oligopoly can be written as: Gc = {N,Q,u}, where player
strategy qi ∈ Qi = R≥0, and player payoff function
ui(qi, q−i) = p(q)qi − cqi; price p(q) is a decreasing func-
tion on total productivity q =
∑
i qi, and marginal cost
c is assumed to be constant. The multi-market oligopoly
instead has m products, and each player distributes one
unit of resource s among the products, earning payoff
from all products invested.
To prove that multi-market firms of the same capac-
ity have a unique and symmetric NE, we follow a list of
propositions shown below. Before getting into the details,
we point out the keys to the proof: convex game guaran-
tees NE exists; equal capacity leads to symmetry; and
monotonic marginal payoffs provide a unique solution.
Proposition 1. Φ(s) is (strictly) concave.
Proof. Let Px(sx) =
∫ sx
0
px(t) dt. Since Px(sx) is a differ-
entiable real function with a convex domain, it is (strictly)
concave if and only if it is globally (strictly) dominated
by its linear expansions: ∀s0 > 0,∀sx ≥ 0, sx 6= s0,
Px(sx)− [Px(s0) + px(s0)(sx − s0)]
=
∫ sx
s0
px(t) dt− px(s0)(sx − s0)
=
∫ sx
s0
px(t)− px(s0) dt ≤ 0
This is true because px(sx) is (decreasing) non-increasing.
Because Φ(s) is a positive linear transformation of Px(sx)
and ux(sx) which is also (strictly) concave, it implies
that Φ(s) is (strictly) concave on the non-negative cone
Rm≥0. Because simplex n∆m−1 is a convex subset of the
non-negative cone Rm≥0, it implies that Φ(s) is (strictly)
concave on the simplex n∆m−1. This proves Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. ui(si; s−i) is (strictly) concave,
∀i,∀s−i ∈ S−i.
Proof. Because simplex Si is a convex subset of the non-
negative cone Rm≥0, if ui(si; s−i) is (strictly) concave on
Rm≥0, ∀i,∀s−i ∈ S−i, then ui(si; s−i) is also (strictly) con-
cave on Si, ∀i,∀s−i ∈ S−i. It suffices to prove the former
statement without constraints on opponent strategies:
ui(si; s−i) is (strictly) concave on Rm≥0, ∀i,∀s−i ∈ Rm≥0.
Because ui(si; s−i) is a positive linear transformation
of uix(six; s−ix), x ∈ E, it suffices if uix(six; s−ix) is
(strictly) concave on R≥0, ∀x, ∀i,∀s−ix ≥ 0. To simplify
notations, this is equivalent to uix(s; c) = px(s + c)s
(strictly) concave on R≥0, ∀x, ∀c ≥ 0. This can be proved
by definition, and we do not include the proof here because
it is straightforward but tedious. The key to this proof is
that ux(sx) is (strictly) concave and px(sx) is (decreas-
ing) non-increasing; either of the optional conditions can
guarantee strict concavity. This proves Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Multi-market oligopoly is a convex game.
Proof. A convex game is a game where each player has
a convex strategy space and a concave payoff function
ui(si; s−i) for all opponent strategies. In this game, player
strategy space is the same simplex Si = ∆
m−1 for all
players, which is convex. Together with Proposition 2,
this is proves Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Multi-market oligopoly has NE, (all
strict).
Proof. A convex game has NE if it has a compact strategy
space and continuous payoff functions, see [48]. Because
the product space of simplices is compact, this game has a
compact strategy space S ≡∏i Si = ∏i ∆m−1. Because
ux(sx) is continuous ∀x, player payoff ui(s) is thus contin-
uous ∀i. This game thus has NE. If ui(si; s−i) is strictly
concave, all NEs are strict. This proves Proposition 4.
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Proposition 5. Multi-market oligopoly can only have
symmetric NE.
Proof. Given a NE s∗, for all player i, equilibrium strategy
s∗i solves the convex optimization problem:
maximize ui(si; s
∗
−i)
subject to si ≥ 0
si · 1 = 1
(A6)
Since this convex optimization problem is strictly feasi-
ble, by Slater’s theorem, it has strong duality. Since the
objective function ui(si; s
∗
−i) is differentiable, the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) theorem states that optimal points
of the optimization problem is the same with the solutions
of the KKT conditions:
∇ui + λi − νi1 = 0 (saddle point)
si ≥ 0 (primal constraint 1)
λi ≥ 0 (dual constraint)
si ◦ λi = 0 (complementary slackness)
si · 1 = 1 (primal constraint 2)
(A7)
Here operator ◦ denotes the Hadamard product: (x ◦
y)i = xiyi. Given the saddle point conditions ∂ui/∂six +
λix − νi = 0,∀x, the dual constraint implies that the
marginal payoff for player i in market x is bounded above:
∂ui/∂six ≤ νi,∀x. If player i invests in market x, six > 0,
by complementary slackness the upper bound is tight,
which means the marginal payoffs for player i are uniform
in all markets i invests. Together, marginal player payoffs
at equilibrium have relation:
∂ui
∂siy
≤ ∂ui
∂six
= νi, ∀i,∀x, y, s∗ix > s∗iy ≥ 0 (A8)
Since ∂ui/∂six = px(sx) + p
′
x(sx)six, and p
′
x < 0, this is
equivalent to px(s
∗
x) ≤ νi + |p′x(s∗x)|s∗ix,∀x, with equality
if s∗ix > 0. If player i invests more in market x than player
j does, s∗ix > s
∗
jx ≥ 0, this implies νi + |p′x(s∗x)|s∗ix ≤
νj + |p′x(s∗x)|s∗jx. But because the players have the same
capacity, player i must have invested less in some market
y than player j does: s∗jy > s
∗
iy ≥ 0, which implies νj +
|p′y(s∗y)|s∗jy ≤ νi + |p′y(s∗y)|s∗iy. Together, these inequalities
imply |p′x(s∗x)|(s∗ix − s∗jx) + |p′y(s∗y)|(s∗jy − s∗iy) ≤ 0. This
contradicts our assumption on player resource allocation,
thus all players must have the same strategy in equilibrium.
This proves Proposition 5.
Proposition 6. Multi-market oligopoly have a (unique)
essentially unique NE, in that marginal player payoffs are
uniform across all invested markets.
Proof. From Proposition 4 and 5, multi-market firms have
NE, which are symmetric. For a symmetric NE s∗, player
strategy s∗i = s
∗/n, and marginal player payoffs in in-
vested markets are the same for all players: νi = ν, ∀i.
Now the relation among equilibrium marginal player pay-
offs can be rewritten as: px(s
∗
x) + p
′
x(s
∗
x)s
∗
x/n ≤ ν, ∀x,
with equality in invested markets, s∗x > 0. Because
φx(sx) = px(sx) + p
′
x(sx)sx/n, this is equivalent to
φx(s
∗
x) ≤ ν, ∀x (A9)
with equality in invested markets. Since ux(sx) is a uni-
variate differentiable (strictly) concave function, u′x(sx)
is (decreasing) non-increasing. Because px(sx) is also
(decreasing) non-increasing, φx(sx) = u
′
x(sx)/n + (1 −
1/n)px(sx) is (decreasing) non-increasing. Define inverse
function φ−1x : R≥0 → R≥0, so that φ−1x (ν) = 0 for
ν > φ−1x (0). The function is non-increasing (decreasing
for ν ≤ φ−1x (0)) and the equilibrium satisfies:
s∗x = φ
−1
x (ν), ∀x (A10)
Since total investment equals the number of players,∑
x sx = n, marginal player payoff in invested markets ν
is determined by: ∑
x
φ−1x (ν) = n (A11)
Because the left-hand side of Equation A11 is decreasing
for ν ≤ maxx φ−1x (0) where the left-hand side is positive,
the equation gives a unique solution ν. Thus Equation A10
gives a (unique) essentially unique s∗. Figure 1d shows
this process graphically. This proves Proposition 6.
Proposition 7. The equilibrium of multi-market
oligopoly is globally asymptotically stable under gradient
adjustment process.
Proof. The gradient adjustment process [33] is a heuristic
learning rule where players adjust their strategies accord-
ing to the local gradient of their payoff functions, projected
onto the tangent cone of player strategy space. Formally,
gradient adjustment process is a dynamical system:
dsi
dt
= PT (si)∇iui(s), ∀i (A12)
Here ∇i denotes the gradient with respect to player strat-
egy si, T (si) is the tangent cone of player strategy space
Si at point si, and P is the projection operator. For all
interior points of the player strategy space, PT (si) is sim-
ply the centering matrix, M1 = I−11T/m. To prove that
the dynamical system is globally asymptotically stable,
we show that V (s) = Φ(s∗)− Φ(s) is a global Lyapunov
function: a function that is positive-definite, continuously
differentiable, and has negative-definite time derivative.
From Proposition 1 and KKT theorem, the maximal
points of the potential function Φ(s) is determined the
same way as Equation A9. That is, the maximal set of the
potential function is identical to the NE of multi-market
oligopoly. This means V (s) > 0 at non-equilibrium points,
so V (s) is positive-definite. V (s) is clearly continuously
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differentiable, and its time derivative
dV (s)
dt
= −∇Φ(s) · ds
dt
= −
m∑
x=1
n∑
i=1
(
∂uix
∂six
− 1
m
m∑
y=1
∂uiy
∂siy
)
φx
= −n
m∑
x=1
(
φx − 1
m
m∑
y=1
φy
)
φx
= −mn
(
φ2 − φ2
)
Here φ =
∑m
x=1 φx/m and φ
2 =
∑m
x=1 φ
2
x/m. Thus, φ
2 −
φ
2 ≥ 0, with equality if and only if φx are all equal. From
Equation A9, we can see that dV/dt ≤ 0, with equality
only at equilibrium points s∗. We have thus shown that
V (s) is a global Lyapunov function of the dynamical
system, which immediately implies Proposition 7.
The stability result in Proposition 7 is only intended
to show that under a simple and plausible learning rule,
global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is pos-
sible in multi-market oligopoly so that the equilibrium
can be empirically observed. The gradient adjustment
process adopted in this paper is not meant to be the exact
learning rule used in real life, which is hard to determine.
But compared with Bayesian or best-response learning
rules, it is less demanding on the players as it does not
require complete information of the game or long-term
memory of the players. And even if some players adopt
alternative, non-economic learning rules, the stability of
the equilibrium may well be preserved. For example, new
drivers may simply choose imitative learning [34, 35], or
in other words “follow the older drivers”. In this case the
Nash equilibrium is still the stable focus as all players
adopt the same strategy and the rational payoff-improving
players adjust to the equilibrium. By imitative learning,
new drivers save the possibly long process of strategy
adjustment and quickly converge to the equilibrium strat-
egy. This allows the equilibrium remain stable under an
evolving set of drivers.
We note that the payoff in multi-market oligopoly is
not strictly diagonally concave, so the uniqueness and
stability results cannot follow [49]. But the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian ∇ (ds/dt) are always negative, so local
asymptotic stability at the equilibrium is guaranteed un-
der gradient dynamics with individual-specific adjustment
speeds. We also note that unlike the Cournot game, multi-
market oligopoly is not an aggregate game defined in
[50] or later generalizations, because player strategies are
multi-dimensional. Thus it does not inherit the stability
under discrete-time best-response dynamics. Multi-market
oligopoly is also not a potential game and thus does not
inherit the general dynamic stability properties in [51]. In-
stead, we provided a “potential function” that is a global
Lyapunov function for the gradient dynamics.
3. Inefficiency of the equilibrium
We notice that in multi-market oligopoly the total
payoff u(s) =
∑
i∈N ui 6= Φ(s), which means total payoff
is generally not maximized in Nash equilibrium, thus not
socially optimal. In fact, if total payoff is maximized, then
∂ux/∂sx ≥ ∂uy/∂sy,∀x, y ∈ E, sx > 0, which means
marginal payoff are the same for all invested markets.
Compare with Equation A9 and the definition of φx(sx),
a weighted average of marginal and average payoff is
balanced instead. With n  1 in the case of NYC taxi
system, we have φ ≈ ux/sx. So at equilibrium the average
segment revenue per service time are effectively the same
for all searched segments.
This is similar to the Cournot game. The total payoff
in the Cournot game is u(q) =
∑
i∈N ui = p(q)q − cq.
Assuming p(q) differentiable, the social optimum is u∗ =
(p(q∗)− c)q∗, where q∗ satisfies p′(q∗)q∗ + p(q∗) = c. The
Nash equilibrium is qi = q
†/n,∀i ∈ N , where q† satisfies
p′(q†)q†/n+ p(q†) = c. This makes q† > q∗ and u(q†) <
u(q∗), so the Nash equilibrium is not social optimal, and
decreases further as the number of player increases.
However, the Nash equilibrium of multi-market
oligopoly is socially optimal if market payoffs are power
functions of the same order: ux(sx) = axs
p
x, ax > 0, p ∈
(0, 1). In this case the total payoff u =
∑
x∈E axs
p
x and
player payoff ui =
∑
x∈E axs
p−1
x six. At social equilib-
rium, ∂ux/∂sx = axps
p−1
x is a constant for all markets
x ∈ E. Since ∑x∈E sx = ∑i∈N∑x∈E six = n, social op-
timal strategy is s∗x = na
1/(1−p)
x /
∑
y∈E a
1/(1−p)
y ,∀x ∈ E.
At Nash equilibrium, for all players i ∈ N , let uix =
uxsix/sx, then ∂uix/∂six = ax
(
(p− 1)sp−2x six + sp−1x
)
is a constant for all markets x ∈ E. This means∑
i∈E ∂uix/∂six = (p − 1 + n)axsp−1x is a constant for
all markets x ∈ E, which gives the same aggregate strat-
egy s†x = na
1/(1−p)
x /
∑
y∈E a
1/(1−p)
y ,∀x ∈ E, so the Nash
equilibrium is social optimal. Use the condition again, we
find Nash equilibrium s†ix = s
†
x/n,∀i ∈ N, x ∈ E.
4. Markov strategy
Here we show the equivalence of Markov strategy and
search time allocation vector. A Markov strategy can be
represented by a search transition matrix Qxy, a right
stochastic matrix that gives the transition probabilities
from every segment x to every neighboring segment y
while the driver is searching for passengers. Let Pxy be
the empirical pickup transition matrix, i.e. row-normalized
trip origin-destination matrix. Let px be the probability
of pickup per search on a segment x, and Px = diag{px}.
We note that Pxy can be easily computed, see e.g. fig. 4a,
while px and Qxy can be computed if high resolution
trajectory data is available. The equilibrium search time
allocation vector s∗ and the Markov strategy Qxy satisfy
the equation:
s∗ = s∗[PxPxy + (I − Px)Qxy] (A13)
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To see this, think of an ensemble of vacant vehicles, each
searching for pickup. After one time step, most continue
to search on neighboring streets; some become occupied
and exit the ensemble, and join the ensemble again after
drop-off. Note that the drivers are non-interacting. Since
we are only counting the allocation of search time, in long-
time limit each driver would have the same allocation of
search time, which equals the ensemble average at any
time, and satisfies the equation as written. Because px
and Pxy are determined by the environment condition,
Qxy uniquely determines s
∗.
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